Description
CockroachDB Cloud users that have been granted the in a cloud organization could use a specific DB Console API for any cluster in the organization and perform SQL admin-like operations including reading from or writing to any table in the cluster. The mentioned API is not publicly documented and is exclusively used internally by a select set of pages in the CockroachDB Cloud Console that retrieve data by proxying to a cluster’s DB Console. The problem poses a company insider risk within your CockroachDB Cloud organization and increases the probability of data exfiltration by users that have been assigned the Developer role and are not intended to have access to data outside of their scope. This applies to any cluster of CockroachDB within a cloud organization, regardless of version. This does not affect you if your company self-hosts and deploys CockroachDB in their own infrastructure. This vulnerability requires CockroachDB Cloud organization membership and can not be exploited by users outside of a user’s CockroachDB Cloud organization.Statement
The problem has been mitigated by a fix that has been applied to the CockroachDB Cloud Console and deployed to all cloud organizations. All users assigned the Developer role in a CockroachDB Cloud organization will now access relevant pages in the Cloud Console using a underlying per-cluster SQL user which has been assigned only the following SQL permissions according to the principle of least privilege:VIEWACTIVITYREDACTEDVIEWCLUSTERSETTINGCONTROLJOB- Cluster node metadata

